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INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM


MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES · BUREAU DES SERVICES DE CONTRÔLE INTERNE  
INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION · DIVISION DE L'AUDIT INTERNE

TO: Mr. Roger Meece,  
A: Special Representative of the Secretary-General  
MONUSCO

DATE: 27 October 2011

FROM: Fatoumata Ndiaye, Director  
DE: Internal Audit Division, OIOS



REFERENCE: IAD: 11- 00651

SUBJECT: **Assignment No. AP2011/620/03 – Audit of electoral support in MONUSCO**

OBJET:

**Overall results relating to MONUSCO's implementation of its electoral support mandate were unsatisfactory; however, management has subsequently addressed the identified issues**

1. Attached please find the final report and audit results on the above-mentioned audit.
2. Annex-I shows the status of recommendations. Please note that OIOS will report on the progress made to implement its recommendations in its annual report to the General Assembly and to the Secretary-General, quarterly for critical recommendations and annually for important recommendations (1 to 3).
3. The audit also identified a number of opportunities for improvement (see Annex-II). While OIOS will not report on the implementation of these opportunities, we encourage you to implement them to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of your operations. OIOS will review their implementation as part of future audits.
4. Please note that under General Assembly resolution 59/272, a Member State may request that the final report be made available. Also note that pursuant to General Assembly resolution 64/263, OIOS has included the complete management response as an appendix to the present report.
5. We wish to express our appreciation to the Management and staff of MONUSCO for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during the assignment.

cc: Mr. Fidèle Sarassoro, DSRSG Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator, MONUSCO  
Mr. Bouah Mathieu Bile, Director of Electoral Division, MONUSCO  
Mr. Paul Buades, Director of Mission Support, MONUSCO  
Mr. Swatantra Goolsarran, Executive Secretary, UN Board of Auditors  
Ms. Susanne Frueh, Executive Secretary, Joint Inspection Unit  
Mr. Moses Bamuwanye, Executive Secretary, IAAC  
Mr. Seth Adza, Chief, Audit Response Team, Department of Field Support  
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Mr. Byung-Kun Min, Special Assistant to the USG-OIOS  
Ms. Amy Wong, Programme Officer, Internal Audit Division, OIOS

# **AUDIT REPORT**

## **Audit of electoral support in MONUSCO**

### **BACKGROUND**

In response to the request of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (GoDRC), the Security Council in its resolution 1925 dated 28 May 2010, authorized United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) to provide technical and logistical support, within the limits of its capacities and resources for: (a) the Presidential and National Assembly Elections scheduled for 28 November 2011; (b) the Provincial Assembly Elections on 26 February 2012; (c) the Senatorial Elections on 30 June 2012; and (d) the Local Elections from January to August 2013.

MONUSCO Electoral Assistance Division (EAD) is responsible for managing the implementation of the Mission's electoral support mandate. MONUSCO works in close collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC). The approved budgets for EAD for fiscal years 2010/11 and 2011/12 were \$40.7 million and \$74.5 million, respectively. EAD has 106 authorized posts including 21 posts for national staff, 38 posts for international staff, and 47 posts for United Nations volunteers.

This audit was included in OIOS 2011 risk-based work plan because of the important role of MONUSCO in supporting the GoDRC with organizing and conducting the national, provincial and local elections scheduled from 2011-2013.

### **OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE**

The audit was conducted to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of risk management, control and governance processes of MONUSCO in providing reasonable assurance regarding the effective implementation of its electoral support mandate. The key controls tested for the audit included those related to: (a) risk management and strategic planning; (b) project management; and (c) coordinated management. The audit covered the period from 1 July 2010 to 31 March 2011.

### **AUDIT RESULTS**

In OIOS opinion, risk management, control and governance processes of MONUSCO examined were **unsatisfactory** to provide reasonable assurance regarding the effective implementation of its electoral support mandate. MONUSCO had deployed more than 1,600 tons of material to the 11 provinces in DRC by end of February 2011 and continued to provide necessary logistical support. However, the Mission had not developed a comprehensive work plan with key performance indicators as a basis for evaluating the programme. There were a number of vacancies in EAD impacting its ability to effectively implement its electoral support activities, and there was an unmitigated risk relating to ensuring the reliability and integrity of data, as full edit rights were shared by EAD and NIEC Data Administrators. Moreover, although not always under the direct control of MONUSCO, there were opportunities to improve controls over the safeguarding of electoral materials and equipment, and enhance coordination mechanisms among those involved in the elections process. MONSUCO has subsequently addressed the concerns raised by OIOS.

## **A comprehensive work plan had not been developed**

A Needs Assessment Team, led by the Department of Political Affairs, visited MONUSCO in July and August of 2010 and provided advice to concerned stakeholders on preparing for the elections. This included the need to increase the capacity of MONUSCO to plan and implement the electoral support programme. However, initially there was not a clear understanding of the level of support expected from MONUSCO, and while EAD had developed terms of reference for each of its pillars, no comprehensive work plan with key performance indicators to monitor its implementation had been developed. Moreover, a security planning document had been drafted by an Electoral Officer in collaboration with the focal point of the NIEC, but it had not been shared with the MONUSCO Safety and Security Section and it had not been approved by senior management.

**(1) MONUSCO should develop a robust and comprehensive work plan including security measures and key performance indicators to effectively monitor the implementation of the electoral mandate. The work plan should be reviewed and approved by MONUSCO senior management.**

*MONUSCO accepted recommendation 1 and stated that it is reviewing its strategy in regular management meetings on provision of assistance to the electoral authority based on best practices and guidelines, and based on Security Council resolution 1991. Also, a robust and comprehensive work plan with key performance indicators has been developed to monitor the implementation of the electoral mandate. The work plan also reflects recurrent changes in the electoral calendar and key decisions taken at a later stage by the electoral authority. Based on the action taken, recommendation 1 has been closed.*

## **Delays in increasing the electoral support capacity of the Mission impacted on the effectiveness of programme implementation**

The critical position of the Director of EAD was vacant for one year, and only four of eight P-4 Electoral Advisors were encumbered. These Advisors were responsible for assisting with strategic planning for the elections in areas of gender, field coordination, administration, civic education and logistics. The recruitment for posts was initiated in a timely fashion, but MONUSCO had encountered difficulties in finding qualified candidates, including French speakers.

The lack of adequate staff had an adverse impact on the Mission's ability to assist NIEC in the voters' registration process, training of electoral workers, public outreach and gender and voter civic education. For example, training for Provincial Trainers, Territorial Trainers and Voters' Registration Agents was scheduled to be completed by 21 January 2011, but it did not start until February/March 2011 in 9 of the 11 provinces. With voters' registration taking an average of 90 days, the planned completion date of 30 June 2011 would not be achieved. Moreover, OIOS visits to 40 training classes (with an average of 30 pupils per class) and interviews with selected trainers showed that some candidates being trained did not possess the requisite basic skills. While the NIEC was responsible for selecting trainees, MONUSCO was responsible for assisting in coordinating training, including ensuring that there was a transparent selection process of candidates.

**(2) MONUSCO should reinforce the Electoral Assistance Division's project management capacity. Particularly, recruitment against existing vacancies should be completed and selected staff assigned to the provinces.**

*MONUSCO accepted recommendation 2 and stated that it was expediting the recruitment against*

*existing vacant posts. This management response was further updated and the Mission informed OIOS that it had completed all recruitments and that the voters' registration process was complete and additional trainings of electoral staff are ongoing. Based on the action taken, recommendation 2 has been closed.*

### **Controls over electoral data needed to be improved in order to ensure reliability and confidentiality of information**

Information technology best practices recommend usernames and passwords to be issued individually. However, two Database Administrators (one EAD staff and one NIEC staff), with full edit rights, shared the same username and password for the electoral database diminishing the reliability and integrity of data. In addition, electoral data was backed up on compact disks that were kept within the NIEC building, where there was no adequate security (e.g. secured location with limited access and copies kept in a different location).

**(3) MONUSCO should ensure that adequate controls over electoral data are implemented. User names and passwords should be individualized and an audit trail made available to track altered or deleted data. Data backup tapes should be kept in a secure location, with restricted access outside of the National Independent Electoral Commission premises.**

*MONUSCO accepted recommendation 3 and stated NIEC had reversed the policy of sharing accounts and passwords. Currently, users have their individual usernames and passwords with limited access. Based on the action taken, Recommendation 3 has been closed.*

### **Controls over electoral and operational materials could be improved**

In 6 of 10 NIEC warehouses visited by OIOS in selected provinces, the required number of security guards was not on duty and the guards on duty were not armed and some were found sleeping. Warehouses were not equipped with surveillance cameras, and several electoral materials and equipment were lost including more than 40 computers, fuel and generators. EAD could not determine at which point of the deployment process materials and items went missing.

Moreover, operational materials including generators, mini-buses, pickup trucks, motorcycles and bicycles that were purchased for the 2005/2006 elections were in a deplorable condition in 10 warehouses visited by OIOS. There were also no inventory records to account for these assets. Vehicles had not been properly maintained to address NIEC transportation needs. As a result, NIEC were often seeking transportation assistance from EAD. *MONUSCO and UNDP have systematically provided advice to electoral authorities on the need to properly safeguard electoral materials and assets.*

### **Action had been taken to improve coordination**

MONUSCO was closely working with UNDP through its Support Project for the Electoral Cycle (PACE) and the NIEC. However, although it was not always a direct responsibility of MONUSCO, there was a need to improve coordination including: (a) the need to ensure timely payment of salaries to NIEC staff to avoid any interruption in training; (b) more involvement of the Public Information Office in organizing outreach activities; (c) ensuring that all relevant sections and units were consulted on security arrangements; and (d) ensuring that task-forces are implemented in all provinces to monitor the effective implementation of the electoral support activities. *MONUSCO informed OIOS it is having daily interactions with the NIEC and UNDP PACE to discuss identified or anticipated issues and to take*

*action. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General had issued a memorandum in March to implement electoral task-forces in all provinces.*

#### **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

OIOS wishes to express its appreciation to the management and staff of MONUSCO for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.

## AUDIT RESULTS

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## AUDIT RESULTS

### I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of electoral support in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).

### II. AUDIT OBJECTIVE

2. The audit was conducted to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of MONUSCO risk management, control and governance processes in providing reasonable assurance regarding the effective implementation of the Mission's electoral support mandate. The key controls tested for the audit included those related to: (a) risk management and strategic planning; (b) project management; and (c) coordinated management. For the purpose of this audit, OIOS defined these key controls as follows:

(a) Risk management and strategic planning - controls that are designed to provide reasonable assurance that risks related to the implementation of the Mission's mandate are identified, assessed and actions are taken to mitigate those risks and that electoral assistance programmes are adequately and effectively planned.

(b) Project management - controls that are designed to provide reasonable assurance that the Electoral Assistance Division (EAD) has sufficient capacity to achieve its mandate. This includes sufficient financial and competent human resources.

(c) Coordinated management - controls that are designed to provide reasonable assurance that issues affecting or involving MONUSCO, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC) are identified, discussed and resolved promptly and in the appropriate forum.

### III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

3. OIOS conducted this audit from January to April 2011. The audit covered the period from 1 July 2008 to 31 March 2011. The 2005/06 elections were not covered in this audit; however, where applicable, relevant data was used.

4. To gain a general understanding of the processes of MONUSCO risk management and strategic planning, project management and coordinated management in support of the elections, OIOS visited 7 of 11 provinces in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to assess how MONUSCO was providing electoral support. The Guidance on Electoral Assistance provided by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and UNDP were reviewed. Interviews were held with key Mission personnel, officials of NIEC and UNDP. Relevant documents were reviewed including progress reports, minutes of meetings held by MONUSCO and the electoral officials of the DRC, evidence of training undertaken, and technical and logistical support provided. An activity-level risk assessment was conducted to identify and evaluate specific risk exposures, and to determine whether controls existed to mitigate such risks.

5. Through interviews, analytical reviews and tests of controls, OIOS assessed the existence, adequate implementation of written policies and procedures, and whether they were implemented consistently.

## IV. OVERALL ASSESSMENT

6. In OIOS opinion, risk management, control and governance processes of MONUSCO examined were **unsatisfactory** to provide reasonable assurance regarding the effective implementation of its electoral support mandate. MONUSCO had deployed more than 1,600 tons of material to the 11 provinces in DRC by end of February 2011 and continued to provide necessary logistical support. However, the Mission had not developed a comprehensive work plan with key performance indicators as a basis for evaluating the programme. There were a number of vacancies in EAD impacting its ability to effectively implement its electoral activities, and there was an unmitigated risk relating to ensuring the reliability and integrity of data, as full edit rights were shared by EAD and NIEC Data Administrators. Moreover, although not always under the direct control of MONUSCO, there were opportunities to improve controls over the safeguarding of electoral materials and equipment, and enhance coordination mechanisms among those involved in the elections process. MONSUCO has subsequently addressed the concerns raised by OIOS.

## V. AUDIT RESULTS

### A. Risk management and strategic planning

There was a need to develop a comprehensive work plan

7. According to the Guidance on Electoral Assistance provided by DPA and UNDP, once a Needs Assessment Team determines that electoral assistance should be provided, the type of assistance should be defined by the electoral assistance focal point, which was EAD for MONUSCO. A Needs Assessment Team, led by DPA, visited MONUSCO in July and August of 2010 and provided advice to concerned stakeholders on preparing for the elections. This included the need to increase the capacity of MONUSCO to plan and implement the electoral support programme. However, initially there was not a clear understanding of the level of support expected from MONUSCO, and while EAD had developed terms of reference for each of its pillars, no comprehensive work plan with key performance indicators to monitor its implementation had been developed. On 28 June 2011, the Security Council, in its Resolution 1991, specified the roles and responsibilities of MONSUCO in the electoral process.

8. Heighten security concerns leading up to, during and after the election period is a major issue in the DRC that needs to be adequately planned for. At the time of the audit, EAD could not provide evidence that, in collaboration with the Safety and Security Section and the United Nations military and police, it had developed an effective security plan for the election period. A security planning document had been drafted by an Electoral Officer in collaboration with the focal point of the NIEC but it had not been shared with the MONUSCO Safety and Security Section and had not been approved by senior management.

#### **Recommendation 1**

**(1) MONUSCO should develop a robust and comprehensive work plan including security measures and key performance indicators to more effectively monitor the implementation of the electoral mandate. The work plan should be reviewed and approved by the Mission's senior management.**

9. *MONUSCO accepted recommendation 2 and stated that a more robust and comprehensive work plan including security planning and key performance indicators had been developed to monitor the implementation of the electoral mandate more effectively. The work plan is up-dated to reflect recurrent*

## AUDIT RESULTS

*changes in the electoral calendar and key decisions taken at a later stage by the electoral authority.*  
Based on the action taken, recommendation 2 has been closed.

### **B. Project management**

The slow assignment of staff impacted on the Mission's capacity to implement electoral support programmes

10. Within an acceptable timeframe and notwithstanding the infrastructure challenges in the DRC, MONUSCO had successfully deployed more than 1,600 tons of electoral and operational material provided by the NIEC to all 11 provinces in the DRC. However, the Mission's capacity to assist NIEC in the training of electoral workers and to carry out gender and civic voter education and public outreach programmes needed improvement. Particularly, EAD did not have sufficient staff to carry out the electoral assistance programmes.

11. The critical position of the Director of EAD was vacant for one year, and only four of eight P-4 Electoral Advisors included in the 2010/2011 budget were encumbered. These Advisors were responsible for assisting with strategic planning for the elections in areas of gender, field coordination, administration, civic education and logistics. The vacant posts included those of the Chief of Operations and the Chief of Logistics that were very critical for the successful planning and execution of the electoral support activities. One post, at P-3 level, and three posts of United Nations volunteers were also vacant at the time of the audit. The recruitment for posts was initiated in a timely fashion, but the Mission had encountered difficulties in finding qualified candidates, including French speakers. For example, in November 2010, none of the five shortlisted candidates for the Logistics Officer post was selected because all the candidates lacked the required experience or skills.

12. The lack of adequate staff adversely impacted on the successful completion of the electoral support activities including the voters' registration process, training of electoral workers, public outreach and gender and voter civic education. For example, the training for the Provincial Trainers was supposed to take place from 4-13 December 2010, the training of the Territorial Trainers was scheduled from 20-29 December 2010, and the training of the Voters' Registration Agents was scheduled from 15-21 January 2011; however, none of them started until February/March 2011 in 9 of the 11 provinces. Voters' registration takes an average of 90 days to complete for each province; thus, it was unlikely that the training would be completed by the initial timeline established.

Training programmes were not fully effective as attendees did not have all the pre-requisite skills

13. EAD had established sub-units for training and capacity building, gender and civic voter education, and sensitization and public outreach. Also, a formal memorandum was sent to the electoral coordinators in the provinces to form task forces led by provincial heads of offices to help monitor electoral support activities. The terms of reference (ToRs) for the Training and Capacity Building Unit specified that the Unit was responsible to assist the NIEC in recruiting its staff and monitoring their training.

14. OIOS visits to 40 training classes (with an average of 30 pupils per class) and interviews of selected trainers indicated that the recruitment of Voter Registration Agents lacked transparency. Some candidates were imposed on training coordinators by local authorities without meeting the pre-requisites such as basic computer skills. While the NIEC was responsible for selecting trainees, MONUSCO was

## AUDIT RESULTS

responsible to assist in coordinating training including ensuring that there was a transparent recruitment process of candidates to be trained.

### **Recommendation 2**

**(2) MONUSCO should reinforce the Electoral Assistance Division's project management capacity. Particularly, recruitment against existing vacancies should be completed without further delays and selected staff assigned to the provinces.**

15. *MONUSCO accepted recommendation 2 and stated that it was expediting the recruitment against existing vacant posts. On follow-up, the Mission had informed OIOS that it had completed all recruitments and that the voters' registration process was complete and additional trainings of electoral staff are ongoing.* Based on the action taken, recommendation 2 has been closed.

### Controls over electoral data management needed improvement

16. Information technology best practices recommend usernames and passwords to be issued individually. However, two Database Administrators (one EAD staff and one NIEC staff) with full edit rights shared the same username and password for the electoral database diminishing the reliability and integrity of data. In addition, electoral data was backed up on compact disks that were kept within the NIEC building, where there was no adequate security (e.g. secured location with limited access and copies kept in a different location).

### **Recommendation 3**

**(3) MONUSCO should ensure that adequate controls over electoral data are implemented. User names and passwords should be individualized and an audit trail made available to track altered or deleted data. Data backup tapes should be kept in a secure location, with restricted access outside of the National Independent Electoral Commission premises.**

17. *MONUSCO accepted recommendation 3 and stated NIEC had reversed the policy of sharing accounts and passwords. Currently, users have their individual usernames and passwords with limited access.* Based on action taken, Recommendation 3 has been closed.

### Controls over electoral and operational materials could be improved

18. There was a lack of adequate controls to safeguard electoral and operational materials. Electoral kits were not always sealed at the time of deployment and those that were sealed were easy to open. Security measures established by the Integrated Electoral Assistance team had not been implemented. In 6 out of 10 NIEC warehouses visited in selected provinces, the required number of security guards was not on duty and the guards on duty were not armed and some were found sleeping. In one instance, the audit team walked in and out of the warehouse without being noticed. Warehouses were not equipped with surveillance cameras, and several electoral materials and equipment were lost including more than 40 computers, fuel and generators. EAD could not determine at which point of the deployment process materials and items went missing.

19. Moreover, operational materials including power generators, mini-buses, pickups trucks, motorcycles and bicycles that were purchased for the 2005/2006 elections were in deplorable conditions.

## AUDIT RESULTS

No physical count was possible by OIOS due to the number and their condition, and no evidence of inventory records was found. This was the case in 10 warehouses visited. The equipments, in particular the vehicles, were not properly maintained to help address NIEC transportation needs. Therefore, NIEC often sought transportation assistance from EAD for in-town movement of personnel or light materials, which resulted in additional cost to the Mission. **MONUSCO could further impress upon NIEC on its need to invest in repairing vehicles stored in their warehouses. This would assist in addressing NIEC's acute transportation needs.** *The Mission informed OIOS that MONUSCO and UNDP has systematically given advice to the NIEC. However, this has not been systematically followed by the electoral authority. In addition to the regular meetings held, the electoral authorities have been reminded of these issues during the recent workshop in Lubumbashi.*

### Need to monitor the cost of deploying materials to the provinces

20. It is best practice for EAD to monitor/track cost of its operations to better manage the budget approved for the electoral support programme.

21. There was no evidence that EAD had a mechanism in place to track/monitor the cost of deploying materials to provinces. In the opinion of OIOS, this was necessary for the planning (in particular, cost of logistic support) of the ongoing electoral process but also for future elections such as the National and Provincial Elections scheduled to take place in 2012 and 2013.

22. In addition, EAD had requested \$70 million for the 2011/12 budget for continued support for the elections while most of its functions were planned to be transferred to UNDP in 2012. This was attributed to the lack of proper planning and the lack of clarity in the level of electoral support to be provided by the Mission. As a result, there is a risk that the budget requested for support for the upcoming elections would not reflect the real financial needs of the EAD. **MONUSCO could develop an effective mechanism to track the cost related to the deployment of materials to the provinces.** *MONUSCO informed OIOS that EAD will liaise with the Office of Mission Support to explore the feasibility of establishing a monitoring tool that tracks expenses for the deployment of materials to regions.*

## C. Coordinated management

23. During the operational phase of the electoral support, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, EAD, Political Affairs Division and Civil Affairs Section (CAS) met on a weekly basis to exchange information on electoral issues. In addition, the EAD established task forces in Kinshasa and in some provinces to coordinate electoral assistance activities. EAD works in collaboration with UNDP through its Support Project for the Electoral Cycle (PACE) and the NIEC. Further, on an ad hoc basis, EAD invited CAS to participate in specific technical meetings e.g. civic education. However, such coordination did not take place before the start of operations and in respect of some critical issues as indicated below:

- The lack of effective coordination between MONUSCO/UNDP/NIEC and the GoDRD resulted in the nonpayment of salaries and subsistence allowances of NIEC staff, which nearly interrupted the training/capacity building activities and caused the Mission to miss the opportunity to use available resources to carry out sensitization activities.
- In North Kivu, the Public Information Office claimed that the electoral team in the Province did not contact or involve them to organize public outreach activities. Also, in the same Province, the electoral team did not work with the Gender Section in Goma to effectively coordinate and promote women's participation in the electoral process.

## AUDIT RESULTS

- The Head of Office in Goma did not know about the requirement to establish a taskforce to carry out and monitor electoral support activities. Also, a task force had not been implemented in the Oriental Province (Kisangani).
- EAD could not provide evidence of an effective coordination mechanism with the GoDRC, NIEC, MONUSCO Security Section, United Nations military and police to build an adequate and comprehensive security plan to secure all warehouses with sensitive material (e.g. electoral kits) and all voters' registration sites.

24. Even though the Mission was not fully responsible for directly implementing many of the activities, OIOS was of the view that some of the above-mentioned issues could have been avoided or addressed in a timely manner if **MONUSCO had, in collaboration with all relevant units (within the Mission), the GoDRC and the NIEC, developed and implemented and a more effective coordination mechanism.** *MONUSCO informed OIOS that it has daily interactions with the National Electoral Commission and UNDP PACE to discuss identified or anticipated issues and remedial actions. Also, EAD had organized a retreat in mid-September 2011 with all stakeholders to discuss identified anticipated issues and take action. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General had issued a memorandum in March to implement electoral task-forces in all provinces. The salaries of the NIEC staff have been paid.*

AUDIT RESULTS

ANNEX I

**STATUS OF RECOMMENDATIONS**  
**Assignment No. AP2011/620/03 - audit of electoral support in MONUSCO**

| Para. no. | Recommendation   | Risk category | Risk rating | C/O <sup>1</sup> | Actions needed to close recommendation | Implementation date <sup>2</sup> |
|-----------|--|---------------|-------------|------------------|--|----------------------------------|
| 1         | MONUSCO should develop a robust and comprehensive work plan including security measures and key performance indicators to effectively monitor the implementation of the electoral mandate. The work plan should be reviewed and approved by MONUSCO senior management.   | Strategic     | Important   | C                | Action taken                           | Implemented                      |
| 2         | MONUSCO should reinforce the Electoral Assistance Division's project management capacity. Particularly, recruitment against existing vacancies should be completed and selected staff assigned to the provinces.   | Operational   | Important   | C                | Action taken                           | Implemented                      |
| 3         | MONUSCO should ensure that adequate controls over electoral data are implemented. User names and passwords should be individualized and an audit trail made available to track altered or deleted data. Data backup tapes should be kept in a secure location, with restricted access outside of the National Independent Electoral Commission premises. | Operational   | Important   | C                | Action taken                           | Implemented                      |

1. C = closed, O = open

2. Date provided by MONUSCO in response to recommendations.

AUDIT RESULTS

ANNEX II

**OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT**  
**Assignment No. AP2011/620/03 - audit of electoral support in MONUSCO**

| Para. no | Opportunities for improvement  | Client comments   |
|----------|--|---|
| 19       | MONUSCO could further impress upon NIEC on its need to invest in repairing vehicles stored in their warehouses. This would assist in addressing NIEC's acute transportation needs. | <i>The Mission informed OIOS that MONUSCO and UNDP has systematically given advice to the NIEC. However, this has not been systematically followed by the electoral authority. In addition to the regular meetings held, the electoral authorities have been reminded of these issues during the recent workshop in Lubumbashi.</i>   |
| 22       | MONUSCO could develop an effective mechanism to track the cost related to the deployment of materials to the provinces.  | <i>MONUSCO informed OIOS that EAD will liaise with the Mission Support Section to explore the feasibility of establishing a monitoring tool that tracks expenses for the deployment of materials to the regions.</i>  |
| 24.      | MONUSCO, in collaboration with all relevant units (within the Mission), the GoDRC and the NIEC, developed and implemented a more effective coordination mechanism.                 | <i>MONUSCO informed OIOS that it has daily interactions with the National Electoral Commission and UNDP PACE to discuss identified or anticipated issues and remedial actions. Also, EAD had organized a retreat in mid-September 2011 with all stakeholders to discuss identified anticipated issues and take action. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General had issued a memorandum in March to implement electoral task-forces in all provinces. The salaries of the NIEC staff have been paid.</i> |