



## INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION

# AUDIT REPORT

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### Management of the Security Sector Support Programme in UNMIT

UNMIT's support to security sector review and reform in Timor-Leste has not been fully effective

23 December 2009

Assignment No. AP2009/682/02

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United Nations  Nations Unies

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES · BUREAU DES SERVICES DE CONTRÔLE INTERNE  
INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION · DIVISION DE L'AUDIT INTERNE

TO: Mr. Atul Khare  
A: Special Representative of the Secretary-General  
UNMIT

DATE: 23 December 2009

REFERENCE: IAD: 09-

FROM: Fatoumata Ndiaye, Acting Director  
Internal Audit Division, OIOS



SUBJECT: **Assignment No. AP2009/682/02 - Audit of the management of Security Sector Support Programme in UNMIT**  
OBJET: **Programme in UNMIT**

1. I am pleased to present the report on the above-mentioned audit.
2. Based on your comments, we are pleased to inform you that we will close recommendations 6 and 7 in the OIOS recommendations database as indicated in Annex 1. In order for us to close the open recommendations, we request that you provide us with the additional information as discussed in the text of the report and also summarized in Annex 1.
3. Please note that OIOS will report on the progress made to implement its recommendations, particularly those designated as high risk (i.e., recommendations 1-3 and 5-7) in its annual report to the General Assembly and semi-annual report to the Secretary-General.

cc: Mr. Takahisa Kawakami, Deputy SRSG for Security Sector and Rule of Law  
Mr. Finn-Reske Nielsen, Deputy SRSG for Governance Support, Development and Humanitarian Coordinator  
Mr. Murray McCullough, Chief, Security Sector Support Unit  
Mr. Hubert H. Price, Chief of Mission Support, UNMIT  
Mr. Swatantra Goolsarran, Executive Secretary, UN Board of Auditors  
Ms. Susanne Frueh, Executive Secretary, Joint Inspection Unit  
Mr. Seth Adza, Chief, Audit Response Team, Department of Field Support  
Mr. Moses Bamuwanye, Chief, Oversight Support Unit, Department of Management  
Mr. Byung-Kun Min, Special Assistant to the USG, OIOS  
Ms. Eleanor T. Burns, Chief, Peacekeeping Audit Service, Internal Audit Division, OIOS

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## INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION

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### FUNCTION

*“The Office shall, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations examine, review and appraise the use of financial resources of the United Nations in order to guarantee the implementation of programmes and legislative mandates, ascertain compliance of programme managers with the financial and administrative regulations and rules, as well as with the approved recommendations of external oversight bodies, undertake management audits, reviews and surveys to improve the structure of the Organization and its responsiveness to the requirements of programmes and legislative mandates, and monitor the effectiveness of the systems of internal control of the Organization” (General Assembly Resolution 48/218 B).*

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### CONTACT INFORMATION

**ACTING DIRECTOR:**

Fatoumata Ndiaye: Tel: +1.212.963.5648, Fax: +1.212.963.3388,  
e-mail: [ndiaye@un.org](mailto:ndiaye@un.org)

**ACTING DEPUTY DIRECTOR:**

Gurpur Kumar: Tel: +1.212.963.5920, Fax: +1.212.963.3388,  
e-mail: [kumar@un.org](mailto:kumar@un.org)

**CHIEF, PEACEKEEPING AUDIT SERVICE:**

Eleanor T. Burns: Tel: +1.212.917.2792, Fax: +1.212.963.3388,  
e-mail: [burnse@un.org](mailto:burnse@un.org)

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Audit of the management of the Security Sector Support Programme

OIOS conducted an audit of the management of the Security Sector Support Programme in the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). The overall objective of the audit was to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of UNMIT's support to the Government of Timor-Leste in strengthening the security sector by establishing effective, accountable and sustainable security institutions. The audit was conducted in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.

There were indications that UNMIT took a number of steps to support the security sector support programme; the most notable being the mobilization of \$4 million in extrabudgetary resources which were channeled through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the establishment of two security sector reform projects, which were jointly implemented by UNMIT and UNDP. However, the Mission's support to the Government of Timor-Leste has not been fully effective and efficient as indicated by the following:

- The Mission is expected to coordinate its work with other partners in strengthening security institutions, but there was no consolidated and clear methodology and plan of action, developed in collaboration with the Government and other national and international actors, for the security sector reform. Attempts by the Mission to agree its priorities with the Government did not achieve the desired results;
- Delays in establishing the Mission's security sector support capacity precluded it from properly articulating its support strategy and establishing an effective working relationship with the Government from the outset;
- The Government's lack of cooperation with and interest in UNMIT's support, and the Mission's failure to conduct the required reassessment of its staffing needs for the security support programme, resulted in the underutilization of advisers recruited by the Mission. Only two of the eight advisers on-board were co-located with their counterparts and many advisers complained that the Government did not request for their input in many reform initiatives; and
- The respective roles and responsibilities of UNMIT and UNDP regarding the implementation of UN security sector review and capacity development facility projects were not clearly defined.

OIOS made seven recommendations to address these issues. UNMIT accepted all the recommendations and has started to implement them.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of the management of the Security Sector Support Programme in the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). The audit was conducted in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.

2. UNMIT has a mandate to assist the Government in conducting a comprehensive review of the role and needs of the security sector, with a view to supporting the Government through the provision of advisers and in cooperation and coordination with other partners, in strengthening security institutions.

3. In accordance with Security Council Resolution 1704, UNMIT established the Security Sector Support Unit (SSSU) under the direct responsibility of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Security Sector Support and Rule of Law. The Unit became operational in August 2007. The following table shows the staffing summary of the SSSU.

**Table 1: Staffing summary of the SSSU as at 30 June 2009:**

<b>Post Title</b>	<b>No of posts</b>	<b>Staff on Board</b>
Senior Security Sector Reform Officer (P-5)	3	3
Security Sector Reform Officer (P-4 and P-3)	9	8
Administrative Assistant (Field Staff-FS-5)	1	1
Administrative Assistant (National Prof. Off.)	1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>13</b>

4. Comments made by UNMIT are shown in *italics*.

## II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES

5. The main objective of the audit was to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of UNMIT's support to the Government of Timor-Leste in strengthening the security sector by establishing effective, accountable and sustainable security institutions through a coordinated development of coherent and sustainable national security policies, structures and process.

## III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

6. The audit covered the period from the inception of the Mission in August 2006 to 31 July 2009 and focused on the management of the security sector support activities including planning, execution of tasks and coordination of actors in the security sector reform process.

7. The audit methodology mainly comprised interviews of the senior management and staff of UNMIT, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Project Manager and UNDP advisers on security sector reform. It also included a review and analysis of work plans, Results Based Budgeting (RBB),

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Security Sector Reform (SSR) project documents, minutes of meetings of SSR working groups and other documents relevant to the programme.

8. The audit did not review UN SSR project expenditures as they were subject to UNDP Regulations and Rules.

## IV. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### A. Management of the security sector support programme

9. Security Council Resolution 1704 mandates UNMIT to assist the Government of Timor-Leste in conducting a comprehensive review of the role and needs of the security sector, with a view to supporting the Government through the provision of advisers and in cooperation and coordination with other partners, in strengthening security institutions. The overall goal is to help in establishing effective, accountable and sustainable security institutions through a coordinated development of coherent and sustainable national security policies, structures and processes. The focus should be on executive security agencies, armed forces, police and law enforcement agencies, relevant line ministries and judicial, legislative and civil society oversight bodies. Accordingly, the Mission established SSSU with 14 authorized posts including 12 posts of reform officers at the professional level as indicated in Table 1.

10. UNMIT's security sector advisers were underutilized primarily due to the Government's lack of cooperation with and interest in UNMIT's support, and the Mission's failure to conduct the required reassessment of its advisers programme. Delays in establishing the Mission's security sector support capacity precluded it from properly articulating its support strategy and establishing an effective working relationship with the Government from the outset. The first few staff, including the Unit Chief of the SSU, resumed their respective duties in August 2007, a year after the Mission was established. The post of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Security Sector Support and Rule of Law was vacant from December 2007 through October 2008. Following are some specific observations relating to the management of the security sector support programme.

#### **i. Lack of terms of reference and consolidated methodology for the security sector support programme**

11. The Mission is expected to coordinate its work with other partners in strengthening security institutions, but it did not provide OIOS with the requested consolidated and clear methodology and plan of action, developed in collaboration with the Government and other national and international actors, for the security sector reform.

12. In 2006, UNMIT's Transitional Team conducted a comprehensive assessment to determine the appropriate organization structure and staffing needs of the SSSU. The output of the assessment was the draft mandate implementation

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plan (MIP), which specifies certain priorities for the Mission and outlines the operational concept for the SSSU. According to the Mission, the Government did not respond to its request for the Government's views on the draft MIP and the proposed role of the SSSU.

13. With the support of UNMIT, the Government established a Security Sector Review Joint Working Group in late 2006 to develop the Terms of Reference (ToR) and modalities for initiating a comprehensive review of the security sector. The Working Group met three times to discuss the ToR and was dissolved without establishing the ToR. Additionally, three workshops were held to review various security sector components, including the plans for further development of the police and military, and the modality for the review of the security sector. However, this initiative also did not produce the desired result.

## **ii. Implementation of security sector reform activities**

### **Reform, restructuring and rebuilding plan for the Timorese National Police not implemented**

14. As part of its mandate and within the context of the security sector reform, UNMIT took initiatives to reform the Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL). An arrangement called the Supplemental Arrangement, on the restoration and maintenance of public security in Timor-Leste and on the assistance of the reform, restructuring and rebuilding (RR&R) plan for the PNTL and the Ministry of Interior, was signed by UNMIT and the Government on 1 December 2006. The arrangement provided, under Section 11, that UNMIT, in close cooperation and consultation with the Ministry and other relevant authorities, shall prepare a draft plan for the RR&R of the PNTL and shall submit the plan to the Government within 90 days of the effective date of the Supplemental Arrangement. Once approved, this plan would constitute the basis for the RR&R of the PNTL.

15. UNMIT prepared the RR&R plan and submitted it to the Government in January 2008; however, according to the Mission, the Government had not endorsed the plan. Some stakeholders interviewed by OIOS stated that there was a low buy-in of the RR&R plan due to the Mission's failure to ensure the involvement of national counterparts, particularly the PNTL, in the preparation of the plan.

### **Deployment of UNMIT's advisers**

16. Advisers can provide expert assistance when requested by the Government, but the Government did not request for UNMIT's advice regarding the SSR. For example, the Government did not request for UNMIT's input in the development of the legislative framework and draft laws on the security sector. Due to Government's lack of interest, majority of UNMIT advisers were not deployed as intended. Only two of the eight advisers on-board were co-located with their counterparts within the Office of the Secretary of State for Defence (SoSD). No advisers were provided to some critical areas of the security sector including the Office of the Secretary of State for Security (SoSS).

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17. As of the audit date, there were some indications of the Government's desire to begin actively engaging of UNMIT on SSR activities. For example, the Parliamentary Committee B has requested for UNMIT's views on the legislative package of National Security Law (NSL), National Defence Law (NDL) and Internal Security Law (ISL), and the SoSS had requested UNMIT's assistance in drafting a Civil Protection Law. Majority of the interviewees raised concerns that more intervention of UNMIT Senior Management is required to expedite the security sector review process, and to increase the level of UN-Government interaction on SSR.

Other indications of the Government's lack of interest in UNMIT's support to the SSR

18. There were other indications of the Government's lack of cooperation with UNMIT and interest in the Mission's support to the security sector reform process as follows:

- Although the SSSU was a member of the National Security Policy Working Group led by the SoSS, it was not invited to and therefore did not participate in the meetings of the Group; and
- The Chief of the SSSU was not invited to and therefore did not participate in the first two Project Management Board (PMB) meetings of the SSR projects held in 2008.

19. Most interviewees indicated that the Government considers the review of the security sector as being complete. They stated, for example, that the defense doctrine and strategic plan on the capabilities and build-up of the defense force (Force 2020 Plan) was completed in September 2008. Also, the NSL, ISL and NDL has been passed by the Council of Ministers in June 2009 and submitted to the National Parliament for ratification. According to UNMIT, the above-mentioned laws should have been based on a comprehensive review and an overarching National Security Policy, which were still in progress at the time of the audit.

**iii. Inadequate assessment of the staffing needs of the SSSU**

20. As indicated above, the draft MIP prepared in 2006 identified the staffing needs of the SSSU, subject to further review of the adviser programme. Whereas the need for further review of the advisers was apparent as it was underscored in 2007 by the SSR Joint Working Group and the then DSRS, the review had not been completed.

21. Although the Mission had not properly assessed its staffing needs as anticipated, it encumbered all of the authorized posts. As per the 2006/2007 budget, the Transactional Team proposed eight professional staff, but seven international and one national staff posts were approved. In the 2007/2008 budget, the Mission doubled its requirement for professional staff from six to twelve by first conducting the anticipated review. The Mission justified the proposed increase in the number of professional level posts in the budget stating

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that four advisers, at the P-4 level, would be assigned to the Ministry of Defence and the Falintil-Forças Armadas de Defesa Timor-Leste (F-FDTL) and two advisers, at the P-3 level, would be assigned to the Ministry of Interior. However, the staff recruited against the posts were not assigned as provided in the approved budgets. Rather, they were assigned to different functions within the SSSU including gender affairs, economic affairs, policy coherence, policy analysis, reporting, etc.

22. The SSSU drafted a draw-down plan for its advisers; however, the plan was not approved by the Budget Steering Committee of the Mission, and therefore, not implemented. The Mission did not provide any records showing the reasons why the Budget Steering Committee refused to approve the drawdown.

### **Recommendations 1 and 2**

#### **UNMIT Management should:**

**(1) Reassess the role and staffing needs of the Security Sector Support Unit and appropriately realign the staffing levels of the Unit with its functions in the next budget cycle; and**

**(2) Identify more effective means for supporting the security sector review and reform.**

23. *UNMIT Management accepted recommendation 1 and stated that staffing is reviewed on an ongoing basis to meet operational demands. As such, one P-4 Security Sector Support Officer (Intelligence) post is to be downsized in the 2010/2011 budget, as it is obsolete. Otherwise, SSSU staffing is to be maintained in its present form in the 2010/2011 budget to capitalize on recent positive Government engagement in defence and security sector reform (including the legislative framework). Recommendation 1 remains open pending OIOS' receipt of supporting documents evidencing that staffing needs of the SSSU have been realigned in the 2010/2011 budget.*

24. *UNMIT Management accepted recommendation 2 and stated that the absence of a DSRSG for Security Sector Support and Rule of Law for almost a year hampered the ability of the Mission to gain the maximum political support necessary to advance this process. However, the current DSRSG's engagement with Government and parliamentary partners, in combination with the efforts of the SRSR and DSRSG for Governance Support, Development and Humanitarian Coordination, has facilitated greater traction with national partners. OIOS acknowledges the increased efforts of the senior management of UNMIT in supporting the SSR process. Recommendation 2 remains open pending receipt of evidence that this engagement is effective.*

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## B. Coordination of actors in the security sector reform process of Timor-Leste

25. The Mission is expected to support to the Government of Timor-Leste in strengthening the security sector by establishing effective, accountable and sustainable security institutions through a coordinated development of coherent and sustainable national security policies, structures and process. However, there were indications that the desired level of coordination and collaboration had not been achieved, as follows.

### Need for clarification of the roles and responsibilities of UNMIT and UNDP

26. To further support the security sector review and reform process, the Chief of the SSSU obtained funds from donors through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for two projects jointly implemented by UNDP and SSU and governed by a Project Management Board (PMB). As of the audit date, donor funding of approximately \$4 million was earmarked for two projects: (i) Security Sector Review Project (\$1.2 million); and (ii) Security Sector Capacity Development Facility Reform Project (\$2.8 million).

27. The channeling of funds through UNDP complies with the directives of the Policy Committee of the Secretary-General that UNDP should be the lead entity for the administration of trust funds for SSR. However, the Mission experienced difficulties in implementing the decision of the Committee regarding substantive implementation of the two projects. Using the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and Kosovo models, UNMIT prepared the project documents and identified UNDP as the executing agency and UNMIT as the implementing agency. A UNDP-appointed project manager would be responsible for the implementation of the project, report to the PMB, and operate on a day-to-day basis under the guidance of the Chief of the SSSU and UNDP, in liaison with the Government.

28. The Chief of the SSSU informed OIOS that the Unit limited control over the projects' implementation, although the projects were their initiative and a significant portion of the project funds was raised by them. The SSSU was not consulted on some project expenditures, which led to conflicts between the SSSU and UNDP. Some of the expenditures were related to the recruitment of SSR advisers for the Government and Office of the President.

29. OIOS inquired about the exact descriptions of the implementing and executing roles of UNDP and UNMIT respectively. The UNDP representative responded that UNDP terminology changed after the SSR project documents had been drafted, and UNDP was the agency with full responsibility for the implementation of the project while UNMIT served as a partner to UNDP. A UNDP representative also added that they would seek UNMIT's advice and refer to its expertise on substantive issues while implementing the project.

30. Lack of a formal agreement between UNMIT and UNDP may impede the effective implementation of the projects and result in an inefficient use of project funds.

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### **Recommendation 3**

**(3) UNMIT Management should enter into an agreement with UNDP, clarifying their respective roles, responsibilities and working relationship in the overall management of the UN security sector review/reform projects.**

31. *UNMIT Management accepted recommendation 3 and stated that while UNMIT and UNDP were working closely in their assistance to the Government's SSR efforts, UNMIT will consider a document (e.g. exchange of letters) on the roles and responsibilities of UNMIT and UNDP in their assistance. Recommendation 3 remains open pending OIOS' receipt of a copy of the agreement signed between UNMIT and UNDP on their respective roles and responsibilities in their assistance to the Government's SSR efforts.*

#### Need for increased coordination of non-UN actors on security sector reform process

32. Non-UN actors, including bilateral and multilateral agencies, are also actively involved in certain aspects of the security sector reform in Timor-Leste. Advisers provided by these actors worked closely with the national authorities on SSR matters. Some interviewees stated that some offices in the Government prefer working with bilateral advisers but not with advisers provided by UNMIT.

33. The SSSU initiated certain coordinating activities including two meetings of the military attachés of member states in Timor-Leste and an SSR Conference for defence staff of bilateral agencies in 2009. However, more could be done to discuss and coordinate SSR activities in the other areas of SSR, including police, public safety, etc.

#### Need for increased coordination with non-UN actors on SSR

34. An important milestone in the security sector review process was the introduction of a three-tier coordination structure by the Government in August 2007, which was jointly led by the President of the National Parliament and the Prime Minister. The President and the Prime Minister endorsed the need for a comprehensive review process. Subsequently, the Security Sector Reform and Development Team was established and tasked to lead the process. Some interviewees raised concerns about the effectiveness of the three-tier coordination structure.

### **Recommendation 4**

**(4) UNMIT Management should increase its efforts in coordinating the activities of all parties involved in the security sector review and reform process.**

35. *UNMIT Management accepted recommendation 4 but stated that this was contingent upon acceptance and approval by the Government of Timor-*

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*Leste, and the bilateral agencies that mainly prefer direct links with Government. The Government-led National Priorities process could be a tool for coordinating UN and bilateral support to government priority activities, but it presumes that bilateral agencies wish to be coordinated.* Recommendation 4 remains open pending OIOS' receipt of evidence showing that action has been initiated by UNMIT Management regarding the coordination of the activities of the Government and bilateral agencies involved in the security sector review and reform process.

### C. Need for improved management of the SSR projects

36. OIOS noted significant delays in the implementation of the two SSR projects primarily implemented by UNDP as follows:

- The SSR environmental survey, which aims to identify public opinion and perspective and promote a dialogue on security issues, was supposed to be completed by the end of 2008 and a Security Sector Development Plan should have been completed by February 2009. However, as at the date of the audit, neither the survey nor the Plan had been completed;
- The Review Project was signed by the Government and UNDP (UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator) on 13 June 2008 and was expected to be implemented within a 12 month period. Although one year has elapsed after the signature of the project agreements, major activities in the project's work plan had not been completed; and
- The Capacity Building Project was signed on 19 December 2008 with a loyalty period of 18 months. Delays in the implementation of this project are imminent as certain activities depend on the results of the SSR review.

37. A number of factors delayed the projects. According to the UNDP Project Manager, they needed to secure buy-in of the Government. However, the projects were not approved in a timely manner by the PMB. Also, changes to the original project work plans caused some delays. For example, seminars on SSR and workshops on border management were held following a request from the Government, although these were not initially envisioned in the project activities. The Government preferred more seminars and workshops on SSR, which would provide input for the National Security Policy, rather than a review per se.

38. OIOS was informed that the expectations of the SSSU, UNDP and the Government regarding the projects' priorities were different leading to frustration on the part of the SSSU.

#### **Recommendation 5**

**(5) UNMIT Management should work with UNDP and the Government of Timor-Leste to agree on a list of priority project activities and effective mechanisms for managing the security sector reform projects.**

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39. *UNMIT Management accepted recommendation 5 but stated that this was contingent upon the acceptance and approval of the Government of Timor-Leste. In addition to the National Priorities mechanism, the SSR Project Management Board (PMB) is another avenue for coordinating activities. The PMB has Government, UNMIT and UNDP representation, however, UNMIT and UNDP can only propose, not mandate activities. It is up to the PMB, which has a three to two national majority membership, to decide on activities. It is the responsibility of the PMB to direct the project activities as outlined in the two SSR Project documents, signed by the Government. Recommendation 5 remains open pending OIOS' receipt of evidence showing that action has been initiated by UNMIT Management for determining a list of priority project activities and mechanisms for managing the SSR projects.*

#### D. Noncompliance with UN Staff Rules

40. According to UN Staff Regulation 1.1(b), staff members should refrain from accepting any instruction from any government with regard to the performance of his/her duties. OIOS was informed that the draft laws on national security and national defence were not officially shared with UNMIT until the Parliamentary Committee B requested UNMIT's comments on these laws. However, an adviser of the SSSU assigned to the SoSD had actually been involved in the development of these laws. The same adviser also provided significant input to the development of the Force 2020 Plan. The adviser had signed a confidentiality document stating that he would not share any information he gained in the Office of the SoSD with any party, including the UN.

41. In OIOS' view, the action of the staff member violates the UN Staff Regulations. Any advice or other input provided by a UN adviser to the Government should normally be known and made available to the Organization.

#### **Recommendations 6 and 7**

##### **UNMIT Management should:**

**(6) Ensure that advisers provided to the Government of Timor-Leste work under the direct supervision of UNMIT and are accountable to UNMIT for all of their activities in compliance with United Nations Staff Regulations; and**

**(7) Review the circumstances under which a staff member of the Security Sector Support Unit provided unauthorized and unsupervised services to the Government and hold the staff member personally accountable for violating UN Staff Regulation 1.1(b).**

42. *UNMIT Management accepted recommendation 6 and stated that all advisers provided to the Government including those embedded in the ministries*

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*now work under the supervision of UNMIT. Based on the action taken by UNMIT, recommendation 6 has been closed.*

43. *UNMIT Management accepted recommendation 7 and stated that senior management cautioned the staff member at the time of his 2008/2009 e-PAS evaluation in April 2009. Subsequently, on 12 November 2009 the DSRSG for Security Sector Support and Rule of Law explained to the SSoD the UN Staff Regulations, pointing out that the staff member should not sign a document in contravention of UN rules. This information was conveyed to the staff member through the Chief of the SSSU. Based on the action taken by UNMIT, recommendation 7 has been closed.*

## V. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

44. We wish to express our appreciation to the Management and staff of UNMIT for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.

## STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

Recom. no.	Recommendation	Risk category	Risk rating	C/O <sup>1</sup>	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date <sup>2</sup>
1	UNMIT Management should reassess the role and staffing needs of the Security Sector Support Unit and appropriately realign the staffing levels of the Unit with its functions in the next budget cycle.	Human resources	High	O	Receipt supporting documents evidencing that staffing needs of the SSSU have been realigned in the 2010/2011 budget cycle.	2010/2011 budget cycle
2	UNMIT Management should identify more effective means for supporting the security sector review and reform.	Governance	High	O	Receipt of evidence that senior management of UNMIT's engagement with the Government and parliamentary partners is effective.	
3	UNMIT Management should enter into an agreement with UNDP, clarifying their respective roles, responsibilities and working relationship in the overall management of the UN security sector review/reform projects.	Operational	High	O	Receipt of a copy of the agreement signed between UNMIT and UNDP on their respective roles and responsibilities of UNMIT and UNDP in their assistance to the Government's SSR efforts.	
4	UNMIT Management should increase its efforts in coordinating the activities of all parties involved in the security sector review and reform process.	Governance	Medium	O	Receipt of evidence supporting that an action has been initiated by UNMIT Management in pursuit of coordinating the activities of the Government and bilateral agencies in the security sector review and reform process.	
5	UNMIT Management should work with UNDP and the Government of Timor-Leste to agree on a list of priority project activities and effective mechanisms for managing the security sector reform projects.	Strategic	High	O	Receipt of evidence supporting that an action has been initiated by UNMIT Management for determining a list of priority project activities and mechanisms for managing the SSR projects.	
6	UNMIT Management should ensure that advisers provided to the Government of Timor-Leste work under the direct supervision of UNMIT and are accountable to UNMIT for all of their activities in	Governance	High	C	Action taken.	Implemented

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<b>Recom. no.</b>	<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>Risk category</b>	<b>Risk rating</b>	<b>C/O<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>Actions needed to close recommendation</b>	<b>Implementation date<sup>2</sup></b>
	compliance with United Nations Staff Regulations.					
7	UNMIT Management should review the circumstances under which a staff member of the Security Sector Support Unit provided unauthorized and unsupervised services to the Government and hold the staff member personally accountable for violating UN Staff Regulation 1.1(b).	Compliance	High	C	Action taken.	Implemented

1. C = closed, O = open

2. Date provided by UNMIT in response to recommendations.