



Office of Internal Oversight Services

## **INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION**

# **AUDIT REPORT**

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### **Aviation safety in MINUSTAH**

**Compliance with relevant policies was weak**

**30 November 2009**

**Assignment No. AP2009/683/02**

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United Nations  Nations Unies

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES · BUREAU DES SERVICES DE CONTRÔLE INTERNE  
INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION · DIVISION DE L'AUDIT INTERNE

TO: Mr. Hédi Annabi  
A: Special Representative of the Secretary-General

DATE: 30 November 2009

REFERENCE: IAD: 09- **03157**

FROM: Fatoumata Ndiaye, Acting Director  
DE: Internal Audit Division, OIOS

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SUBJECT: **Assignment No. AP2009/683/02 – Audit of aviation safety in MINUSTAH**  
OBJET:

1. I am pleased to present the report on the above-mentioned audit.
2. In order for us to close the recommendations, we request that you provide us with the additional information as discussed in the text of the report and also summarized in Annex 1.
3. Please note that OIOS will report on the progress made to implement its recommendations, particularly those designated as high risk (i.e., recommendations 1, 3-8 and 11), in its annual report to the General Assembly and semi-annual report to the Secretary-General.

cc: Mr. Luiz Carlos Da Costa, Principal Deputy SRSG, MINUSTAH  
Mr. Paul Aghadjanian, Chief of Mission Support, MINUSTAH  
Mr. Swatantra Goolsarran, Executive Secretary, UN Board of Auditors  
Ms. Susanne Frueh, Executive Secretary, Joint Inspection Unit Secretariat  
Mr. Moses Bamuwamye, Chief, Oversight Support Unit, Department of Management  
Mr. Seth Adza, Chief, Audit Response Team, Department of Field Support  
Mr. Byung-Kun Min, Special Assistant to the USG, OIOS  
Ms. Eleanor T. Burns, Chief, Peacekeeping Audit Service, OIOS

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## INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION

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### **FUNCTION**

*“The Office shall, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations examine, review and appraise the use of financial resources of the United Nations in order to guarantee the implementation of programmes and legislative mandates, ascertain compliance of programme managers with the financial and administrative regulations and rules, as well as with the approved recommendations of external oversight bodies, undertake management audits, reviews and surveys to improve the structure of the Organization and its responsiveness to the requirements of programmes and legislative mandates, and monitor the effectiveness of the systems of internal control of the Organization” (General Assembly Resolution 48/218 B).*

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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

### **Aviation safety in MINUSTAH**

OIOS conducted an audit of aviation safety in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). The overall objective of the audit was to determine the adequacy and effectiveness of internal controls over aviation safety. The audit was conducted in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.

The audit identified and made recommendations to address several areas to improve controls over aviation safety in MINUSTAH, including:

- The Aviation Safety Council did not convene monthly as required and critical tasks such as monitoring and evaluating the Mission's aviation safety function were not carried out, resulting in important safety issues recurring over several years;
- Seven of the ten recommendations made by the Aviation Safety Unit in the Department of Field Support during its assistance visit to the Mission in October 2007 had not been implemented;
- The Mission had not implemented the new Operational Risk Management Policy;
- The Aviation Safety Unit was understaffed, impeding its effectiveness;
- The Mission had an Accident Prevention Programme in place, but the Programme was not sufficiently specific regarding, inter alia, required number of helicopter landing site surveys, safety briefings and training; and, there was inadequate monitoring of key related activities;
- Two-thirds of the aviation hazards in 2008-2009 were not reported to Headquarters as required per the Aviation Safety Manual;
- Helicopter/aircraft landing site surveys had not been updated to reflect current conditions of major landing sites. Poor conditions were identified at several major sites raising safety concerns; and
- The tasks of some key personnel in the Emergency Response Plan had not been defined and a full emergency response drill was overdue.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Paragraphs
I. INTRODUCTION	1 - 5
II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES	6
III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY	7 - 8
IV. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	
A. Organization and governance of safety function	9 - 20
B. Core aviation safety activities	21 - 44
V. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	45
ANNEX 1 – Status of Audit Recommendations	

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## I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of aviation safety in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). The audit was conducted in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.
2. The main function of the Aviation Safety Unit (ASU) is the elimination of incidents and accidents through the creation, dissemination and implementation of an effective accident prevention organization/programme. The ASU is also responsible to provide expert advice to the Mission's senior management on matters of aviation safety, risk management, accident prevention and investigation, and to implement the United Nations Aviation Safety Programme, also called the Accident Prevention Programme.
3. MINUSTAH maintains and operates two fixed-wing and ten rotary-wing aircraft (seven under Letters of Assist and five under commercial contracts). The ASU is independent of the Mission's aviation operations. The Chief of the ASU reports to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) through the Chief of Mission Support (CMS). The Unit has a technical reporting relationship to the ASU in the Department of Field Support (ASU/DFS). The ASU consists of two posts, one professional at the P-4 level and one field service (FS).
4. In 2008, MINUSTAH transported 72,500 passengers, registered 6,500 flying hours and had 91 landing sites operational in Haiti. In the same year, ASU reported on 25 hazards and 38 occurrences/incidents.
5. Comments made by MINUSTAH are shown in *italics*.

## II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES

6. The main objective of the audit was to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of internal controls over aviation safety; more specifically to:
    - (a) Determine if the Mission's aviation safety policy and activities meet the UN aviation safety requirements;
    - (b) Verify if the Mission's aviation safety programme was properly established and implemented in compliance with the relevant policies and procedures; and
    - (c) Assess the staff resources and reporting structure of the ASU.
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### III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

7. The audit covered the activities implemented by the ASU since 2006. Some issues, dating back to the inception of the Mission, were also included.

8. The audit methodology comprised a review of relevant documents and information, and interviews with key personnel. Site visits were made to helipads, landing sites and other locations relevant to air operations.

### IV. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### A. Organization and governance of safety function

##### The Mission Aviation Safety Council was ineffective

9. The Mission has an Aviation Safety Council (ASC), which is responsible for ensuring agreement for timely action on identified specific safety-related problems. The Council was not effective in fulfilling this function, resulting in the recurrence of certain safety issues over an extended period. The minutes of the ASC meetings, commencing November 2007, included action points with responsible parties and a timetable for completing each action. However, many of the deadlines were repeatedly extended. Some examples of long unresolved safety issues are as follows:

(a) The poor condition of the emergency access road in Port-au-Prince had been outstanding since May 2006. Engineering work began during the audit;

(b) The Mission continued to lack firefighting capabilities for its airstrips in the regions. This issue had been outstanding since May 2006. The Mission started improving its capacity in August 2008, but some staff in the regions had not been trained in this function; and

(c) There were limited meteorological services and facilities, an issue that had not been resolved since the inception of the Mission.

10. The ASC is responsible for monitoring and evaluating the Mission's Aviation Safety Programme. However, the Mission did not provide any evidence of the Council's review of the effectiveness of the Accident Prevention Programme, the adequacy of corrective actions taken on hazard reports and safety risks.

11. Moreover, the ASC did not convene monthly as required by the Aviation Safety Manual. The ASC had met twice in 2007, four times in 2008 and, as at September 2009, the ASC met three times in 2009. The failure of the

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ASC to meet regularly has impeded its effectiveness, at the risk of safety and security of staff.

### **Recommendation 1**

**(1) The MINUSTAH Office of Mission Support should ensure that the Aviation Safety Council meets regularly and performs its duties in compliance with relevant policies, including the Aviation Safety Manual.**

12. *The MINUSTAH Administration accepted recommendation 1 stating that it would be implemented immediately.* Recommendation 1 remains open pending receipt of minutes evidencing that the ASC has conducted regular meetings and taken responsibility for its tasks in compliance with the Aviation Safety Manual.

### Several recommendations of the UNHQ-NY assistance mission not implemented

13. The Aviation Safety Manual (paragraph 1:6) states that formal Aviation Safety Assistance Visits by UN Headquarters are to be conducted twice a year in those missions where the permanent fleet comprises 10 or more aircraft. The aim of these visits is to identify factors impacting aviation safety in the Mission and remedial actions to enhance aviation safety. The ASU reported that six of ten recommendations of the UNHQ assistance mission comprising staff of the Aviation Safety Unit of the Department Field Support (ASU/DFS), which visited MINUSTAH in October 2007, had been implemented. However, OIOS established that only three of the ten recommendations had been implemented. Three of the six recommendations, which according to the ASU had been implemented, were still in progress, as follows:

(a) ASC meetings were not yet held as required by the Aviation Safety Manual and recommended by the UNHQ team;

(b) The ASU had not yet organized and conducted emergency response exercises as recommended by the UNHQ team; and

(c) The ASU had not reported all observed hazards to the ASU/DFS. From January 2008 to March 2009, 68 out of 102 (67 per cent) observed hazards were not reported to the ASU/DFS. Furthermore, these hazards had not been logged in the official database as required.

14. The Aviation Safety Manual states, Section 1.1.5.1, that all incidents and hazards should be reported to enable the ASU/DFS to adequately monitor them and initiate corrective measures, as needed. The Mission stated that the ASU/DFS, in its Annual Report for 2007, required that starting December 2008, all hazards had to be reported to DFS through the Aviation Inspection and Recommendations Module, and that all observed aviation hazards had been timely reported in the Module.

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## Recommendation 2

**(2) The MINUSTAH Office of Mission Support should expedite the implementation of the recommendations of the Aviation Safety Unit of the Department of Field Support assistance mission conducted in October 2007.**

15. *The MINUSTAH Office of Mission Support accepted recommendation 2 and stated that MINUSTAH was making every effort to implement all recommendations of the ASU/DFS. Recommendation 2 remains open pending receipt of documents showing that all recommendations of the ASU/DFS referred to in paragraph 13 above have been implemented.*

### Inadequate capacity to ensure the ASU functioned effectively

16. The staffing requirements of the ASU were not budgeted for in accordance with the Aviation Safety Manual guidelines. Based on the number of aircraft in the Mission (more than 10 aircraft), the budget should have included two professional staff (P-4 and P-3), and one FS post. However, the Mission budgeted for only one professional post, at the P-4 level, which had been vacant since November 2008. The Mission budgeted for two posts, at the FS-4 and FS-5 levels, but the incumbent for the FS-4 post had been loaned to the Office of the SRSG. Considering the criticality of the functions carried out by the ASU, it is essential that the Unit is adequately staffed with the required number of qualified and experienced personnel.

## Recommendation 3

**(3) The MINUSTAH Office of Mission Support should ensure that the required number and level of posts for the Aviation Safety Unit are established and filled in accordance with the Aviation Safety Manual. In the short-term, the field service post on loan to the Office of the SRSG should be returned to the Unit.**

17. *The MINUSTAH Administration accepted recommendation 3 and stated that the recruitment process for one Aviation Safety Assistant has recently begun. However, the Mission must retain some flexibility to use its resources as requirements evolve. Recommendation 3 remains open pending verification that the required number and levels of posts have been budgeted for and encumbered in compliance with the Aviation Safety Manual.*

### Inadequate planning and monitoring of the Accident Prevention Programme

18. The activities of the ASU are part of the Mission's Accident Prevention Programme. OIOS found that the plan of activities was broad and vague and did not allow a proper evaluation of achievements of the ASU. For example, the plan was not clear regarding the number of periodic helicopter landing site

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surveys to be conducted by the ASU, the number of safety briefings and trainings to be held and the categories of beneficiaries.

19. The ASU provided monthly reports to the CMS on its activities, but the reports did not include comparison of the actual achievements against the planned activities. As a result, the CMS was precluded from effectively managing and monitoring the activities of the ASU. In this regard, many of the activities called for in the Accident Prevention Programme were not implemented. The anticipated maintenance surveys and emergency response exercises were not conducted and only one of two planned Medevac/Casevac exercises was held in 2008.

#### **Recommendation 4**

**(4) The MINUSTAH Office of Mission Support should improve the planning of the Aviation Safety Unit's calendar of work to ensure it is more specific and achievements can be measured. The monthly reporting should also be enhanced to enable the Chief of Mission Support to use it as a monitoring and management tool for the Unit's activities.**

20. *The MINUSTAH Administration accepted recommendation 4 and stated that the calendar of activities of the ASU is prepared taking into consideration scheduled activities such as evaluation, surveys, breath analyzer tests and emergency response plan drills.* Recommendation 4 remains open pending receipt of a revised calendar of work of the Accident Prevention Programme providing for the measurement of achievements against plans and receipt of a monthly report to the CMS that compares achievements against the calendar of activities and gives adequate explanations for deviations.

#### **B. Core aviation safety activities**

##### Hazardous situation and incident reporting was weak

21. Pilots are required to prepare After Mission Reports (AMRs) for use by the Aviation Section in determining whether an Observed Hazard Report (OHR) is warranted. OHR is a tool that allows all UN personnel to report hazards in a timely manner and therefore helps improve the general safety level of the Organization. The OHR provides the basis for the initiation of investigation if necessary. After a hazard has been investigated by the ASU, the relevant OHR must be forwarded to the ASU/DFS as soon as feasible.

22. OIOS identified 20 hazardous situations from 17 AMRs covering the period from December 2008 to March 2009, which were not reported by the concerned pilots in the OHRs. The pilots highlighted in the AMRs, for example, foreign objects on a helicopter landing site, loss of radio contact during flight, bad conditions of a landing site and two 'near miss' incidents. These hazardous situations were not reported in the OHRs because the Aviation Section did not adequately review the relevant AMRs to ascertain the need for submitting OHRs.

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OIOS also found that further training of pilots in reporting hazards was necessary to ensure reporting in accordance with the Aviation Safety Manual.

23. The ASU stated that it did not consider 17 of the above-mentioned 20 situations hazards that needed reporting in the OHRs and the official database, and investigation. According to the Mission Aviation Safety Officer and Chief Aviation Officer, only three of the twenty hazards were reportable hazards, and two of the three reportable hazards were actually reported as required. Based on the criteria set forth in the Aviation Safety Manual, OIOS does not agree that 17 of the 20 situations were not hazards and therefore did not require further follow-up and investigation. The following are examples taken from 20 situations that should have been reported and investigated in compliance with the relevant guidelines:

- (a) Five cases of a complete break-down of communication in-flight with Alpha base;
- (b) Three cases of flight departures/landings without clearance from Air Traffic Control because of communication break-down;
- (c) One 'near miss' incident; and
- (d) Five cases of serious problems with the quality of the helicopter/aircraft landing sites (HLS).

24. If proper follow-up and investigation of hazards are not done, there is a risk that corrective measures are not taken to prevent accidents which could potentially result in the loss of life.

#### **Recommendations 5 and 6**

**(5) The MINUSTAH Office of Mission Support should ensure that all observed hazards and incidents are properly reported by pilots in the Observed Hazard Reports and that the After Mission Reports are adequately monitored by the Aviation Section.**

**(6) The MINUSTAH Office of Mission Support should ensure that the Aviation Safety Unit adequately investigates and properly reports the 20 identified hazardous situations and incidents.**

25. *The MINUSTAH Administration accepted recommendation 5 and stated that an awareness campaign is permanently held by the ASU to make staff members, operators and crew members conscious of their reporting obligation and to promote a safety culture.* OIOS acknowledges the steps taken by the Mission towards implementing this recommendation. Recommendation 5 remains open pending confirmation that After Mission Reports are adequately monitored to ensure that all aviation hazards are properly reported by the pilots.

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26. *The MINUSTAH Administration accepted recommendation 6 and stated that all hazards and incidents are fully and adequately investigated, which is reflected in the Aviation Inspection and Recommendations Module. Ground incidents as well as other types of incidents, mainly of a technical and routine nature are recorded and followed-up in order to record maintenance corrective actions taken by the operator, but they need not be investigated. OIOS does not agree with the explanation provided by the Mission as the 20 situations identified in paragraph 22 above were not reported in compliance with the Aviation Safety Manual. Recommendation 6 remains open pending receipt of the investigation reports per the Inspection and Recommendations Module, including actions taken on the 20 identified hazardous situations.*

#### Timely reporting of incidents to Headquarters

27. According to the Aviation Safety Manual, Preliminary Aircraft Occurrence Reports should be compiled and forwarded to the ASU/DFS normally within 24 to 48 hours after occurrence. However, the Preliminary Aircraft Occurrence Reports were not always provided to the ASU/DFS in a timely manner. The reports of 16 out of 50 incidents (32 per cent) that occurred during the period from 2008 to April 2009 were submitted to the ASU/DFS a month after the related incident occurred and the report was submitted eight months after the related incident. The Mission informed OIOS that the reporting timeframe set in the Aviation Safety Manual is relevant for paper reports, which were abolished since 2007. As soon as a report is logged in the Aviation Inspection and Recommendations Module, it becomes electronically available to the ASU/DFS.

#### Operational Risk Management in aviation not implemented

28. The Mission is required to comply with the Operational Risk Management (ORM) Policy promulgated by DFS on 10 April 2008. ORM is a systematic approach to risk management intended to enhance aviation safety. The Mission had an introductory meeting, but it had not implemented the ORM as at the date of the audit. The Mission's first draft standard operating procedures for implementing the ORM that should have been provided to DFS in October 2008 was not complete.

#### **Recommendation 7**

**(7) The MINUSTAH Office of Mission Support should fully implement the new Operational Risk Management Policy in accordance with the related policy.**

29. *The MINUSTAH Administration accepted recommendation 7 and stated that the ORM Policy will be gradually implemented in the Mission as per the roadmap approved and appropriately revised by Mission management. Recommendation 7 remains open pending receipt of the roadmap and verification that the Operational Risk Management Policy has been fully implemented.*

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Inadequate investigation of accident at Chilean Aviation Contingent

30. In November 2008, the Chilean Contingent reported cracks in one of its helicopters caused by structural fatigue. On 9 January 2009, the Chilean Contingent also reported an accident involving one of these helicopters, which lost the left door in-flight. The Chilean Contingent established the probable cause of the accident as material fatigue. As recommended by the Contingent, the Mission requested the Chilean Air Force, through the Chilean Permanent Mission, to conduct a more detailed inspection of all Chilean Aviation Unit aircraft deployed to MINUSTAH and to identify the exact causes of the accident. In the reply dated 22 April 2009, the Chilean Permanent Mission stated that the accident was caused by human error and that the Chilean Air Force had taken corrective measures in order to avoid the recurrence of these mishaps. The Mission did not provide OIOS with evidence showing exactly what action it took to prevent recurrence.

**Recommendation 8**

**(8) The MINUSTAH Office of Mission Support should follow-up on the investigation request with the Chilean Aviation Contingent and take appropriate action to ensure adequate aviation safety measures are in place.**

31. *The MINUSTAH Administration stated that recommendation 8 had been implemented in January 2009 and the report has been provided and is available in the Aviation Inspections and Recommendations Module. Recommendation 8 remains open pending receipt of documentation evidencing the actions taken by MINUSTAH to address the cause and prevent recurrence.*

ASU did not conduct maintenance surveys

32. Section 2.4.3 of the Aviation Safety Manual indicates that the Aviation Safety Officer should conduct periodic maintenance surveys and review the maintenance administration of all carriers to create a standardized level of aviation safety. Maintenance surveys were not conducted. As a result, certain issues relating to spare parts inventory at the Chilean Aviation Contingent were not identified and addressed by the ASU. For example, for more than one year, the spare parts inventory for Chilean helicopters had been inadequate, resulting in the cannibalization of one of the four aircraft to provide spare parts for the other three. The cannibalization of the aircraft reduced the availability of air service to 21 per cent during the period from July 2008 to the time of the audit, and increased the risk of accidents resulting from overuse of the available aircraft. OIOS notes that full availability of a minimum of three aircraft was agreed to and included in the contract with the Chilean Aviation Contingent.

**Recommendation 9**

**(9) The MINUSTAH Office of Mission Support should ensure that the Aviation Safety Unit conducts regular maintenance surveys of all flight operators.**

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33. The MINUSTAH Office of Mission Support accepted recommendation 9 and stated that it would be implemented immediately. Recommendation 9 remains open pending verification that the required aircraft maintenance reviews and surveys have been conducted by the ASU.

Helicopter/aircraft landing site surveys not updated

34. All HLS need to be approved for use to ensure that it is safe for operation. OIOS' audit of aviation safety in MINUSTAH (AP2004/683/03) highlighted the absence of approvals for the use of five HLS. The required approvals have now been obtained, but there is no evidence showing that surveys for major landing sites in Port-au-Prince, Cape Haitian and Hinche have been regularly updated. It was therefore not clear if the surveys reflect the current status of the HLS. For example, the surveys for rotary-wing aircraft for Les Cayes and Jeremie were conducted in 2005, when in reality fixed-wing aircraft have been used at these sites for over two years.

35. The lack of updated helicopter/aircraft landing site surveys/documentation resulted in the unavailability of information on the current conditions of the major landing sites. This condition could potentially compromise aviation safety as the Mission may be precluded from taking the necessary actions to correct problems identified by the surveys. In this regard, OIOS identified a number of problems at some landing sites that could have been identified and corrected if the surveys had been updated as required.

36. The Jeremie landing site, which was not paved, had significant problems. The heavy presence of sharp rocks and loose stones on the runway damaged aircraft tires. Through discussions with pilots, it was established that although the problem had been reported, it had not yet been adequately addressed by the Mission.

37. Additionally, in Jeremie, firefighting equipment was inadequate. At the time of the visit, there was only one fire extinguisher present near the plane as compared to the requirement of two. The second fire extinguisher was left in a truck by the Air Liaison Officer. The airport authority had fire extinguishers in the airport building, but these were not operational.

38. OIOS' field visit also revealed that the aircraft parking area was soft in some areas. This problem is increased during the rainy season. This is a recurring problem that was fixed a year ago, but the heavy rains indicate the need for constant attention and a more permanent solution.

**Recommendation 10**

**(10) The MINUSTAH Office of Mission Support should ensure that regular surveys are conducted for all major landing sites to assess current conditions and to take steps to improve them.**

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39. *The MINUSTAH Administration accepted recommendation 10 and stated that the Air Terminal Unit (ATU) inspects technical landing zones located in remote areas as a policy every 145 days. Regular and night landing zones are permanently under the supervision not only of the ATU staff but also the pilots who use these landing zones on a daily basis, in line with Aviation Section SOP 9-17 and 9-19. Recommendation 10 remains open pending receipt of copies of the updated major helicopter/aircraft landing site surveys reflecting the current conditions, including those of Port-au-Prince, Cape Haitian, Hinche, Les Cayes and Jeremie, and a report on the corrective actions taken regarding the problems noted in Jeremie.*

Emergency Response Plan not fully implemented

40. The purpose of the Emergency Response Plan (ERP) is to provide procedures for the maximum protection of life and property by ensuring coordinated action and timely guidance in the event of an aircraft accident. The Mission is supposed to conduct a full drill once a year to test the validity of the plan and identify areas for improvement. A full drill should involve all actors in the plan and be as close to reality as possible.

41. The only full emergency response drill of the Mission was conducted on 29 May 2008. No drills were conducted in the regions. Moreover, the Air Traffic Control, Transport Officer, MOVCON staff, Civilian Aviation Units, Air Liaison Officers, Fire Marshall and the Administrative Duty Officer were not involved in the drill conducted on 29 May 2008. Tasks were not defined in the ERP for the Fire Marshall, Joint Operations Centre Coordinator (JOCC), Air Traffic Control, Air Liaison Officers and Administrative Duty Officer.

**Recommendation 11**

**(11) The MINUSTAH Office of Mission Support should ensure that all tasks and responsibilities in the Emergency Response Plan (ERP) are clearly defined and specifically assigned for all key personnel, and that the Aviation Safety Unit organizes full ERP drills annually to test the effectiveness of the Mission's Emergency Response Plan.**

42. *The MINUSTAH Administration accepted recommendation 11 and stated that the ERP is a living document, periodically updated based on the results of the exercises or the operational or environmental changes. Responsibilities are well defined and included in the plan. Recommendation 11 remains open pending receipt of the updated ERP that includes the tasks and responsibilities for the Fire Marshall, JOCC, Air Traffic Control, Air Liaison Officer and Administrative Duty Officer, and the receipt of a report confirming that a full ERP drill was held that included all key actors.*

Aviation safety awareness not included in staff induction programme

43. As per the Aviation Safety Manual, the ASU is responsible for keeping the Mission staff informed of actual and potential hazards and their possible

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effects on safety through proactive safety education and awareness campaigns, and a generic briefing on aviation safety should be provided to all new staff. However, the Mission's induction programme for new staff did not include any briefing on aviation safety.

#### **Recommendation 12**

**(12) The MINUSTAH Office of Mission Support should include a briefing on aviation safety in the Mission's induction programme for new staff members.**

44. *The MINUSTAH Administration accepted recommendation 12 and stated that all international civilian personnel receive an initial briefing on the basic issues of aviation safety prior to any deployment to a Mission. This training is held in UNLB, Brindisi. Additionally, the Office of Mission Support circulates periodic information on aviation safety to all staff by means of online broadcasts, bulletins and posters distributed by the ASU. This outreach procedure has proved effective in informing staff members on updated aviation safety matters and their responsibility to cooperate. As many staff do not participate in the training held at UNLB, the circulation of critical information only through emails and posters may not be sufficiently effective. Recommendation 12 remains open pending confirmation by the Mission that aviation safety has been included in the MINUSTAH staff induction programme.*

### **V. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

45. We wish to express our appreciation to the Management and staff of MINUSTAH for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.

## STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

Recom. no.	Recommendation	Risk category	Risk rating	C/O <sup>1</sup>	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date <sup>2</sup>
1	The MINUSTAH Office of Mission Support should ensure that the Aviation Safety Council meets regularly and performs its duties in compliance with the relevant policies, including the Aviation Safety Manual.	Governance	High	0	Receipt of minutes evidencing that the Aviation Safety Council has conducted regular meetings and taken responsibility for its tasks in compliance with the Aviation Safety Manual	Immediately
2	The MINUSTAH Office of Mission Support should expedite the implementation of the recommendations of the Aviation Safety Unit of the Department of Field Support assistance mission conducted in October 2007.	Operational	Medium	0	Receipt of documents showing that all recommendations of the ASU/DFS referred to in paragraph 13 above have been implemented.	Not provided
3	The MINUSTAH Office of Mission Support should ensure that the required number and level of posts for the Aviation Safety Unit are established and filled in accordance with the Aviation Safety Manual. In the short-term, the field service post on loan to the Office of the SRSG should be returned to the Unit.	Human Resources	High	0	Verification that the required number and levels of posts have been budgeted for and encumbered in compliance with the Aviation Safety Manual.	November 2009
4	The MINUSTAH Office of Mission Support should improve the planning of the Aviation Safety Unit's calendar of work to ensure it is more specific and achievements can be measured. The monthly reporting should also be enhanced to enable the Chief of Mission Support to use it as a monitoring and management tool for the Unit's activities.	Operational	High	0	Receipt of a revised calendar of work of the Accident Prevention Programme providing for the measurement of achievements against plans and receipt of a monthly report to the CMS that compares achievements against the calendar of activities and gives adequate explanations for deviations.	30 October 2009
5	The MINUSTAH Office of Mission Support should ensure that all observed hazards and incidents are properly reported by pilots in the Observed Hazard Reports and that the After Mission Reports are adequately monitored by the Aviation Section.	Operational	High	0	Confirmation that After Mission Reports are adequately monitored to ensure that all aviation hazards are properly reported by the pilots.	Not provided
6	The MINUSTAH Office of Mission Support should ensure that the Aviation Safety Unit	Operational	High	0	Receipt of the investigation reports per the Inspection and Recommendations Module,	Not provided

Recom. no.	Recommendation	Risk category	Risk rating	C/O <sup>1</sup>	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date <sup>2</sup>
	adequately investigates and properly reports the 20 identified hazardous situations and incidents.				including actions taken on the 20 identified hazardous situations.	
7	The MINUSTAH Office of Mission Support should fully implement the new Operational Risk Management Policy in accordance with the related policy.	Operational	High	O	Receipt of the roadmap and verification that the Operational Risk Management Policy has been fully implemented.	February 2010
8	The MINUSTAH Office of Mission Support should follow-up on the investigation request with the Chilean Aviation Contingent and take appropriate action to ensure adequate aviation safety measures are in place.	Operational	High	O	Receipt of documentation evidencing the actions taken by MINUSTAH to address the cause and prevent recurrence.	Not provided
9	The MINUSTAH Office of Mission Support should ensure that the Aviation Safety Unit conducts regular maintenance surveys of all flight operators.	Operational	Medium	O	Verification that the required aircraft maintenance reviews and surveys have been conducted by the Aviation Safety Unit.	Immediately
10	The MINUSTAH Office of Mission Support should ensure that regular surveys are conducted for all major landing sites to assess current conditions and to take steps to improve them.	Operational	Medium	O	Receipt of copies of the updated major helicopter/aircraft landing site surveys reflecting the current conditions, including those of Port-au-Prince, Cap Haitian, Hinche, Les Cayes and Jeremie and a report on the corrective actions taken regarding the problems noted in Jeremie.	Not provided
11	The MINUSTAH Office of Mission Support should ensure that all tasks and responsibilities in the Emergency Response Plan (ERP) are clearly defined and specifically assigned for all key personnel, and that the Aviation Safety Unit organizes full ERP drills annually to test the effectiveness of the Mission's Emergency Response Plan.	Compliance	High	O	Receipt of the updated Emergency Response Plan that includes the tasks and responsibilities for the Fire Marshall, JOC Coordinator, Air Traffic Control, Air Liaison Officer and Administrative Duty Office, and the receipt of a report confirming that a full ERP drill was held that included all key actors.	Not provided
12	The MINUSTAH Office of Mission Support should include a briefing on aviation safety in the Mission's induction programme for new staff members.	Compliance	Medium	O	Confirmation by the Mission that aviation safety has been included in the MINUSTAH staff induction programme.	Not provided

1. C = closed, O = open

2. Date provided by MINUSTAH in response to recommendations.